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John Higginson
THE HIDDEN COST OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION: REFLECTIONS
ON THE EMERGENCE AND
REPRODUCTION OF THE AFRICAN
INDUSTRIAL WORKING CLASS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Hundreds of miles south were the gold-bearing
reefsofJohannesburg; hundreds of miles north,
the rich copper mines. These the two lode-
stars of the great central plateau, these the
magnets which drew men, white and black;
drew money from the world's counting houses;
concentrated streets, shops, gardens; attracted
riches and misery-particularly misery.
Doris Lessing, Eldorado.
T illS PAPER AMOUNfS toaseriesofdiscursive reflectionsonwhyindustrial capitalismhas assumed the shape that it did in southern Africa- and in South Africaparticularly-during thetwogenerationsbeforethecommencementof struggles
forpoliticalindependence in Africa.It is far fromthelast wordon thesubject.However,
it triestodrawattentiontoanhistoriographicalproblemwhichhasremained undeservedly
submerged in recent works: the relationship between the labor process-what Marx
often referred to as the "hidden abode" of industrial capitalism-and the social
reproductionof the industrialworkforce.'
I start with several prepackagedassumptions: 1) that with the close of the First
World War and the global recession of 1921-22the colonial possessionsof southern
Africa were brought increasingly into a regionaleconomicsystem; 2) that for several
generationstheeconomicandpoliticalfortunesof themoreperipheral of thesesocieties
such as Mozambique, Bechuanaland or Nyasaland were tied to the major centers of
industrial production (South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the mining and refining
zones of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga Province, Belgian Congo) as sources of
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migrant labor, cash crops and, to a lesserextent, food; and 3) that the transformation of
colonial agriculture between 1900 and 1940 made it extremely difficult for the rural
areas to reproduce subsequent generations of industrial workers-at least to the
spe.cifications oflocal miningmagnatesand industrialentrepreneurs. Consequently, in
their efforts to shore up the regional economy, accumulate capital, and forge the
functionalequivalent of nationalmarkets,local entrepreneurs were often compelledto
seek assistance from abroad, despite incipient white settler nationalism.s
EARLY PHASES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
South Africa's initial phase of industrialization began with the discovery of
diamondsat Kimberley in 1868and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886.3 By the 1890s
the impact of these discoveries had permanentlychanged the face of South Africa. In
1887,for example,Johannesburghadbeena sleepyrural hamletof about 3,000people;
by 1899, less than thirteen years after the initial discovery of gold, it was a bustling
industrialcityofmore than100,000people,withall thegrimsocialillsofaboomtown-
drunkenness, prostitution, dangerous working conditions,crime of both an organized
and gratuitous sort, a near complete absence of public transportation and a means of
disposing waste, and a sharp, vicious competitionfor housingand services among the
city's workingpopulation.s All thesefactors,combinedwithanespeciallyvirulentform
of institutional racism, enhanced the discontinuousnatureof industrialization.
The Boer or South African War of 1899-1902 gave industry the means to make a
revolutionary sweep of the entire region.t For example, in Southern Rhodesia shortly
after the war, mining companiesbegan to jettison subsidiaryeconomicactivities such
as land speculation and trading.s Farther north, in Katanga, the amount of land under
mineral prospection increased fourfold between 1903 and 1907.7 The war was also a
great watershed in terms of the psychologicaldispositionof African migrant workers:
those whocame to the work sitesand industrial townsbefore the war did not believe in
industry's permanence, even if they no longer believed that the whites were suddenly
going to disappear into the ocean; those who came after the war were more or less
convinced of industry's permanence, even if they felt it possible to loosen their own
dependence on wage labor.s At the close of the war all the peoplesof southernAfrican
would look back on the swift economicchanges that had been wroughtby cannonsand
Gatlinggunsas wellas machinetoolsand drillingrigs in muchthe samewaythat former
slavesand slave mastersmusthave lookedat the AmericanCivilWar, forboth conflicts
were more than just a series of militaryconquests.They were the end of a wayof life.?
From 1907 to the mid 19208 other industrial towns sprang up in southern Africa.
Many of the new industrial towns suffered from the same social ills that had plagued
Johannesburga generationbefore,albeitona smallerscale.wMeanwhilelargefinancial
interestsbegantoreplacespeculativeinvestmentin miningandrelatedindustries.White
farmers began to clamor for a largerportion of the African labor supply. And Africans
who lived in the vicinity of the Rand and the other industrial redoubts proved as
refractory towagelaboras thosewhoweremoreremovedfromtheindustrialworksites.
African labor thereforecontinuedto be scarce and relativelydear from the employers'
3
Higginson: The Hidden Cost of Industrialization: Reflections on the Emergenc
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1992
230 John Higginson
vantagepoint.t! Consequently, industrial expansion continued to be greatlydependent
on the migrantlaborsystem.However, the institutional mechanisms thatanimatedthe
systemsuchas theWiterwatersrand NativeLaborAssociation (WNLA) andtheBourse
du Travaildu Katanga (BTK)weregrippedby numerous crises towardthe end of the
19208, so much so, that industrialentrepreneurs would, on occasion, focus on local
sourcesof Africanlabor.12
The expropriation of African landowners also continued apace. The various
colonialgovernmentstooktheleadinseizingland,eventhough muchoftheexpropriated
land wound up in the hands of white traders and absentee landlords. Moreover,
govemmentofficialswerefacedwiththeprospectoflegitimatingallforms ofinfringement
on thepeasantrywhiletransforming themintoregularliens.Localmagistrates, manyof
whom were settler farmers, often intervened for their own self-serving reasons and
further undermined the legitimacy of the new measures. Broader interpretations of
extant labor regulations were not forthcoming. And the expropriation of African land
often had no justificationother than to prevent Africanpeasants from competing too
keenly with white farmers, while forcing themand their able-bodied kin to work for
those very samefarmers,»
On occasion,instancesof agrarianprotestsuchas the 1906Bambatha Rebellion in
Natal,SouthAfrica,attestedtothesharpdeclineinruralIivingstandards, thecontraction
of Africanaccessto the localmarkets, and the tenuous but coercivenatureof theruleof
law where Africans were concerned. Money-minded peasant farmers came in for a
specialdrubbing.In instanceswheretheirland wasnot seizeddirectly, theywereoften
jostled on to thebarrenland of theNativeReservesby exorbitantanimallicensing and
dippingfees.Fines for promotingsoil erosionby cultivating land too intensively were
also egregiousirritants. Thestingof thesemeasures wasfurtherenhancedby thefactthat
the more successful white farmers in colonies such as Southern Rhodesia and
Bechuanalandcarelesslydestroyedthousands ofacresofland bycultivating tobaccoand
cotton severalyears in a roW.14 Rather than face such exactions, manyyoungmen left
their home villages,even if they did not leave the rural areas altogether.»
Official statistics about emigration were at great variance with what officials,
particularlylocalones,knew the situationto be. For example,until 1928,the railways
and governmentagenciesin SouthAfricacollectedAfrican immigration statisticsin a
manner thatdeliberately disguisedthe massive unofficial immigration to South Africa
fromtheneighboring colonies.» TheInyangaDistrictof Southern Rhodesiaisa casein
point.Thousands of menfromthisdistrictmadetheirway to SouthAfricaviafootpaths
inMozambiqueandworkers'networks insideSouthernRhodesia. Outof all theAfricans
fromSouthernRhodesiawhoattemptedtoreachtheexpanding labormarketof theSouth
AfricanRandin the 1920s,thosefromInyangawereapparently themostsuccessful. The
secondmostsuccessfulgroupof migrants wereAfricans alreadyengagedinworking at
mines and farms in SouthernRhodesiaitself. Many of these men were encouraged to
leave their employersby Europeanlaborcontractors.'?
All the colonialgovernments in questionfurtherexposedAfricans to the greedof
residentandabsenteelandlords. It wasnotfornothing, therefore, thatbothgovernments
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pushedfor legislationthatwouldhaveforcedAfricantenantstoregisterimmediately the
births of new children once the clamor for African labor grew more shrill. Infant
mortalityamong rural Africanswas not so meticulously scrutinized, however.
Large-scale capitalist agriculture meant dispossessing hundredsof thousands of
Africanpeasantsandmovingapotentiallyenormouslandlessworkforce tosettlerfarms,
mines and factories. There was no guarantee-s-or even real likelihood-that a large
additioncouldbe madeto the Africanworkforce withoutgreatlyreducingproductivity.
Maintaininganurbanpopulationwouldhavebeenmuchmoreexpensive thanmaintaining
a moreself-sufficientrural one,especiallyin theabsenceof a strongnetworkof internal
transportation, which would itself have been expensive to create. Most colonial
governmentsin southernAfricandecidednot to chooseeitheroption.Rathertheychose
aspects of both, wheneverit seemedexpedient
By 1913 the legal disenfranchisement of rural Africans in South Africa was
completed. The Union Government, which had come to power in 1910, passed the
Masters and Servants and Native Land Acts. Together the two laws attached almost
eighty percent of Africanland in South Africa.Africanswho held land on the basis of
writtentenureweredispossessedasswiftlyas thosewithcustomary claims.IS Underthese
circumstancesSouth Africa's mineowners becameconvincedthat thoseAfricanswho
had been directly uprootedby the state's initiatives and economic conjuncture, could
become the core of a permanent industrialworkforce, and that migrant labor from the
neighboringcolonies did not have to be sought so assiduously. The mineowners also
perceivedthe largelymale Africandomesticservantpopulation of theRand as a likely
sourceof mine labor.Consequently, the numberof AfricanrecruitsfromMozambique
and elsewhereheadingfor Natal and theRand declinedsharplyfor about five to seven
years.t?
The impactof thisdemographic fillipwasjust theoppositeof whatthemineowners
envisioned. Rather than work on the mines, thousands of Pedi, Sotho, and Zulu
adolescents flooded the labor market for domestic servants in Johannesburg and
Pretoria,thusaggravatingthe teemingconditionof the Africanpopulation in theRand's
major cities. African mine workers mounted three major strikes: that of the Sotho
diamondminersat Jagersfontein in January 1913;that of 2,800 Africanworkers at the
Van Ryn Deep gold mine in December1915;and that of 15,000Africanminersat the
Ferreira and RobinsonDeep Mine in July 1918.20
The strikes at Ferreira and Robinson Deep Mine were the most importantof the
three, notonlybecauseit wasthe largestandelicitedthe mostdirectandviolentreaction
from the state-troops were stationed on the mines for more than a week after the
strike-but also because it challenged further the employers' withdrawal from the
migrant labor system. The majority of the strikers had come from the surrounding
countryside.Their demand for a wage increase of three to five shillingsa day-about
one-fourth of the average white miner's wage was directly linked to the relationship
between the plight of peasant tenants on the maize farms and the wartime labor
shortages. For their own good reasons, the African workers were "pushing for
proletarianization."21
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Againstthisbackground moreor lesspermanent urbanAfrican communities arose.
Throughout the 1920s they became the incubators of an incipient regional African
workingclass, particularly once the rail systembegan to connect industrial worksites
as far northas JadotvilleandElisabethville in KatangaProvince, BelgianCongowith
thoseas far southas Bloemfontein andCapetown, SouthAfrica. The speedwithwhich
theindustrialtownsbecamelinkedwasalarmingtomanycolonialofficials, foritseemed
tovitiatetheeffectivenessofpassbooksandotherformsofinfluxcontrol. Afterthispoint
it wasentirelypossibleto envisionan African manfromsayHomoine, Mozambique or
BOOta, SouthernRhodesiawhowoulddo twoninemonth contracts in thegoldminesof
theRand,returnbrieflyto his villageaftereachcontractonly todiscoverthathewasno
longersuited for rural life, andthen finallypush on to Lourenco Marques to becomea
chauffeur, or to the mines of either the Roan Selection Trust Limited in Northern
Rhodesiaor thoseof theUnionMiniereduHaut-Katanga in theBelgianCongo. Lodges,
burial societies, and other less formal networks of information and resources that
traversedcolonialboundaries wouldhavehelpedsucha persontofindworkanda sense
of belongingin a given urbancommunity duringan odyssey that could havelastedfor
20 years or SO.22 A respectable number of colonial officials were therefore eager to
subject the urbanAfricanpopulation undertheirjurisdictionto morerigorous forms of
repression and surveilance.
THE MATURATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKING CLASS
Between 1922 and 1927 southern Africa's industrialization reached a seminal
phase.As wehaveseen,itbeganunderanextremely contradictory setoflegal andsocial
conditions. Forwhilethethreecentersofindustrial production-South Africa, Southern
Rhodesiaand the miningregionsof KatangaandNorthern Rhodesia-acquired greater
definition,a coherent labor policy failed to obtain in any of the three. Europeanand
Africanworkersvigorously protestedthenewdispensation, but for obviously different
reasons and from differentvantagepoints. Moreover, the agricultural price slumpsof
1922and 1927threatened middling whitefarmers as wellas thoseAfrican smallholders
whohadsurvivedthevicissitudes of the 1903-07 Depression andtheFirstWorIdWar.13
Whitefarmers, whiteworkers, andAfrican workers challenged largercapitalistinterests
and hampered the state's ability to weigh in exclusively on the side of the big
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the ability to determine the regional market became
essentiallya questionof capital and labor.
Aragingpolicydebateabouttheimportanceofforeign investment forindustrialization
developedon top of local effortsto shape the incipientAfrican workforce. This debate
characterized official discourse in all the colonies of the region for more than a
generation. Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular, began to depart from a
model of enclave industrial production-one characterized by a close association of
foreign investment, mining and agriculture-and moved toward a more diversified
patternof industrialization. Rapidmechanization and theadventof tensof thousands of
Africanoperativesoccurredsimultaneously in the sheet metal, furniture making,food
processing, textile,andmachinetool industries. The significanttwistwas that the state
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and the industrialists attemptedsuchrenovation withoutattempting to redraft the wage
bill.24
Put another way, the various colonial governments and employers in southern
Africansought to proletarianizeAfricanswithoutcreatinga working class.They were
not successful,although their efforts could hardlybe describedas feeble. In lieu of a
coherent labor policy that tied African wages to productivity, a much impoverished
combinationof pass laws,industrialcouncilsand wageboardsobtained. Theauthorsof
these policies envisionedthe Africanworkforceas : 1. a depressed rural proletariatin
regions where white farmers had usurped African systems of land tenure; 2. tenant
farmersand somerural laborersin areas whereAfricanpeasants continuedto compete
for a share of the regional market; 3. a depressed industrial proletariat in the mining
industry,whichwouldbe severelylimitedasfarasindustrial combination wasconcerned
given the constraintsof the migrantlaborsystem;and 4. an urban industrial proletariat
inthetextile,foodprocessing,andmetallurgical industries, composedlargelyofAfrican
maleswho wouldbe subjectto the variouspasslawsand whosewagewouldbe roughly
one-fifthof the white industrialwage.2S
Few Africansescapedthesocialconsequences of industrial transformation. Bythe
latetwentiesandthirtiesdirectcoercioncontinuedto figureimportantly intherecruitrnent
of industrialworkers-accounting for perhapstwo-fifthsof the industrialworkforce in
the twoRhodesiasand Katangaand as muchas a thirdin SouthAfrica.26 But its agency
hadchangedfromtheprivaterecruitingcompaniesto thecourtsandtheprisons.Convict
labor and the continued use of chibaro or forced labordepressedAfricanwagesin the
miningindustrythroughoutthe region-more so in fact thanthe introduction of female
and child labor.27 Convict laborers often worked off their sentences in their home
regions. Controlof the districtcourts by white farmersand mine managers in Katanga,
the two Rhodesias, and Natal, South Africa, for example, insured a steady flow of
prisoners to local farms and mines. The colonial governments rationalized such
repression, which recalled the behavior of seventeenth and early eighteenth century
English justices of the peace, with explanations that harked back to Quaker labor
recruiters and press gangers:
Most of the Native Commissioners report favorably on the new method of
sending tax defaulters to detention camps in the Reserves instead of gaol.
They do useful work such as making roads, and at the same time earn tax due
on nearby farms and mines ...28
Despite the brutalityof the forced labor system,those menaffectedby it managed
to create a rich set of traditionsthat expresseditself in songs,dancesand variousforms
ofvoluntaryassociation. Theseinstancesofaburgeoningregionalworking-classculture
were more than mere metaphorsof urban class and race relations. On occasion, they
provided a means to salvage communalvalues in the face of acquisitive, self-serving
employers and colonial officials and a decadent colonial version of European high
culture.29 Songssungon theroad to themines,rail campsandfactoriesby menwhohad
been forciblyconscriptedwereoften takenup by thosewho hadcome to the worksites
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voluntarily. Livingandworkingconditions weresimilarforbothgroups. Accidents and
hazards to life and limb failed to distinguish between forced and freely contracted
workers. Deathanddisease stalkedbothgroupsofworkers.wPerhapsthemostimportant
difference between the two groups of workers was the initial reluctance of forcibly
conscripted workerstoengageinstrikesandworkactions. OnceAfrican workers began
to organize themselves into mutualaid societies and lodges, however, as a meansof
negotiating the harshcircumstances of work,thesedifferences weresoon mitigated.s!
THE REDEFINITION OF AUTHORITY
Containedwithin thelaborproblem of the 1920s, onceAfricanworkers learnedto
defend themselves against the more negative effects of wage labor, was the more
complexproblemof effectivecontrolover laborand the employers'and the state's use
of variousmethodsof coercionto retakethe initiative againsttheworkers. Intheory, the
state articulated the demands of the employers through the pass laws, the industrial
councilsandwageboards,whilethelabormarketresponded automatically to thestate's
commands. In fact, this was no more than a caricatureof the actual relations between
capital and labor.Of this more intractable problem,Jean Sohier,a policemagistrate in
Katangaobserved:
I have just indicated that it is through existing personnel that control over the
native workers must be assured. It behooves to us to spell out precisely
measures which would impose rigorous moral and financial guarantees on
labor contractors andrecruited natives alike.Thereshould be strict observance
and control of visas; better census and statistical records should be kept; and
employers should not be late with information and forms that aid these
endeavors.32
As a result of the kindof slippages alludedto by Sohier, the migrantlabor system
began to proveantithetical to manyof theexpectations of bothemployers and workers.
Morethanjustcost-effectiveness wasat therootof thismanagerial shift: ruralideologies
of protest such as AfricanWatchtower or kitawala (literally, the"power to govern"in
Swahili), mucapi (the "Great Cleansing" in Bemba), and the African Independent
Churchmovements werebeginning to havea compelling effecton urban and industrial
workers. Meanwhile, by means of the strike, the boycott and other kinds of work
actions-the workerswere movingrapidlyaway fromprotest aimedat the agentsand
subordinates of their employers (laborcontractors, camp managers, and merchants) to
protest aimedat natureof work itself)3
An inchoatebut insurrectionary language and vocabulary wasinjectedintoworker
protestby the Adventistand millenarian sects.Perhapsonlya minority of workers took
it literally.Yearsofdeferenceto thecolonialmasters and political repression hadmade
themcautious-even in thefaceof incipientpopularunrest. ButAfrican adventistsects
generateda politicalvocabulary in the indigenous African languages thatwassharedby
boththecredulousand theskeptlcal,> Forexample,on 18December 1923,afterseveral
monthsofWatehtowerpreaching, thecampmanager of theWankiecollieryinSouthern
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Rhodesia was apprised of the general mood of the African workers by way of an
anonymous note:
... All these men are saying that you white people will leave on the 1st of
January. The first (to go) will be Mr. Thomson, with the Doctor and Mr.
Darby, and you Mr. Kidd. All of you shall go and your authority (ufumu) shall
pass to the society.
Is this true? We want to know. Also they are saying that there is no
Satan in heaven. Satan (they say) is the Native Commissioner. Let us know
if this is true.35
Initially, African Watchtower and other millenarian ideologies mediated the
language of protest. However, African workers often took over such ideologies and
refashioned with the language and discipline of the factory and the mining site. An
African worker who refused to work for low wages was a thousand times more
dangerous than one who believed in witches. And one who believed in an ultimate
connection between "witches" and unscrupulous employers-and could convince
others of such-could send the system reeling. "Proofs" of this nature were in great
abundance in the 1930s, as the Depression undermined the conventions of both the
ancestors and modem capitalism.
The first phase of the Depression sapped the initiative of labor, however. In South
Africa, for example, the rhythm of strikes from 1930 to 1932 demonstrated just how
desperate the plightofthe African working-class must have been at this juncture: in 1930
there were 12 strikes in which the average number of strikers was over 5,000-6 work
days were lost as a result; in 1931 there were 19 strikes and about 7,419 strikers per
strike-e-Ll working days were lost; in 1932 there were over 30 strikes, but the average
number of striking workers fell to 6,52O--almost 12 working days were lost,36
Not only were strikes often long and bitter, but they netted the workers almost
nothing. The strikes of 1931 and 1932 in South Africa were especially egregious: those
of 1931, along with the anti-pass law demonstrations in Durban, Pretoria, and East
London led to a series of riots and bloody police repression; those of 1932, along with
the 40 per cent inflation of South African currency that year, led to bone-chilling wage
cuts in transport, commerce and distribution.t? African workers' wages in the rail
industry fell below the minimum stipulated by the Wage Board, and remained there until
1938.38 Strikes-when they occurred-took on an increasingly defensive character.
The major industrial firms of southern Africa had no immediate solutions to the
crisis of the early thirties, other than to tie the wage rates of African workers in
manufacturing to those of migrant African labor in the mining industry, and to flood the
transport and building trades industries with poor whites from the rural areas.s? Given
the inflexible nature of the Wage Boards and Industrial Councils, this was the best that
employers were prepared to do until the end of the Second World War. African workers
fought this stick-minus-carrotpolicy throughout the latterpart ofthe 30s and the 40s with
increasingly militant strikes and work actions; but between 1933 and 1938, they were
obliged to adopta different tack. For this briefperiod, the principal terrain ofthe workers'
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struggle shifted from the workplace to the workers' neighborhoods, from the wage
problem to the burning problem of survival within the confinesof the cities.w
THE REMAKING OF THE WORKING CLASS
By 1934 the problem of reproducing African wage labor in the urban areas had
reached crisis proportions. Its sharpest manifestations were in the cities that had been
passedoverby theexpansionof factoryproductionin the 1920s,andincitieswherelarge
numbers of African and Colored workershad been replaced by poor whites.s!
In terms of numbers and sheer size, the industrial proletariat was shifting from
mining, the buildingtrades and docks to the dairy, textile,munitions,and machinetool
industries;in termsof gender,perhapsone-fifthof the industrialworkersin thesouthern
Africa's urban areas were Africanand Colored women.Moreover, the Depression was
thecatalystfora rapidanddramaticfeminization of domesticserviceinSouthAfricaand
SouthernRhodesia.ss Rural white womenand unemployedAfricandockworkers from
Capetown,PortElizabethandEastLondonfloodedthepoolofworkersinSouthAfrica's
textile industry.The employers were elated. Their ability to introduce piece rates and
other featuresof scientificmanagementwithonlysporadicresistancewasthecrowning
achievement of this short term victory over the workforce. In 1930 a private welfare
agentandlobbyistfor theSouthAfricantextileindustryfromthecityofPietermaritzburg
attempted to assess the demographic transformation of the workforce:
... Another aspect is this, that ourNative labourers who live in these urbanized
communities have changed very much in this community during the last ten
years, whereas a great number used to come from Zululand and from this side
of Natal--the north side here-it is now coming from Transkei; and from
Basutoland and Pondoland; a very different type of boy altogether. ..
The flooding of the workers' ranks in various industries tended to dilute but not
obliterateworkercombination.Tobe sure,Africansyndicalistorganizations suchas the
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (lCU) of South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia experienced a marked decline in membershipand the numberof successful
strikes ledby suchorganizationsfelloff sharply.However,theconvergenceof thewage
questionand theprospectof reproducinga growingsegmentof theworkingclass within
the urbanlocationsand townshipsexpandedthe listof workers' grievances.Thepairing
of these two problems produced analogous responses throughout southern Africa. In
1934, a former factory operative at the Union Miniere felt obliged to set down his
thoughts on this matter in Ngonga, a weekly journal aimed at the urban African
population of Katanga:
Many whites are astonished when they hear us ask for better housing and to
be treated better on the work sites. They maintain that we are stretching their
good will and asking for too much or, more often, that we desire to live like
them ...
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Allow me to draw attention to the fact that while a small hut might have been
suitable for our needs in the past, it is altogether unsuitable now ... , we can
no longer live as we did in the past ...43
237
Three years earlier A. W. G. Champion, a former officer of the South African ICU, had
put it more succinctly: "It is another big subject which I do not want to enter upon-this
giving of Native sports when the Native wants more money. It is like giving us a stone
when we ask for bread:44
Some of the most successful instances of African worker organizations were found
among skilled workers in the building trades-quarrymen, hod and tool makers,
brickmakers and so on. As mightbe expected, African craftsmen in the building trades-
like their white counterparts-tended toward craft exclusionist kinds oforganization, so
that their respective trades would not be swamped by the new initiates of industrialism.
This was a relatively successful strategy, except where the introduction of piece rates
forced craftsmen to organize along more industrial lines. Since African workers could
not legally enter into industrial combination anywhere in southern Africa, except in
those industries where the workers' strength had compelled the wage boards and
industrial councils to make special concessions, such craftsmen often had to choose
between a dilution oftheir skill, followed by a subsequentcut in wages, or leaving a given
trade altogether. Given the hardness of this choice, the few strikes that occurred were
violent and bloody.4s
Dock work in Capetown was also a highly contested enclave of employment for
African and Colored workers. However, after the First World War, the rise of the ICU
mitigated much of the inter-ethnic rivalry over employment on the docks.46 ICU
agitation won higher wages for both African and Colored dockers. But with the advent
of the Depression and the failure of many of the strikes of the earl y thirties, employers
slashed the work week to four days and initiated a massive drive for "containerization"
as a means to cope with labor redundancy. The dockers' weekly wage rarely, if ever,
achieved the official average of 38 to 42 shillings a week. Monthly rents in the urban
locations of Langa and Ndabeni absorbed over a fourth of the workers' weekly wage,
transportation to the docks and other work places another fifth.s"
Thousands of workers fled with their families to cheaper living quarters in the
squatters' areas of Kensington and Windemere. Others left the industry and the city
altogether. Many took employment in the textile mills of Paarl and Worcester. A core
of African dockers remained in the urban locations, however, and fought a rearguard
battle against escalating rents and declining wages.«
Once theICUcollapsedat the outsetofthe thirties, middle-class welfareorganizations
in Capetown's African andColored communities attempted to revive the specter oflabor
competition in order to acquire working-class constituencies. Oftentimes the testimony
that spokesmen for these organizations gave before the industrial commissions
inadvertently revealed something of their motives. In 1932 Josiah McOmbring, presi-
dent of the African Aboriginal Association, gave this testimony before the Native
Economic Commission:
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... It was customary for the colored labourers in the Docks to have sports,
football and so on, and as a result of their enthusiasm for these things much
inconvenience was caused in regard to the loading and discharging of cargo
at the Docks. The Superintendentofthe Dockshad to rely very much upon this
kind oflabour and in that way the native got a footing. The fact that the native
has become a competitorof the coloured man at the Docks was brought about
by the action of the coloured men themselves; they did not sufficiently
consider the interests of the office for which they were working. They
absented themselves to take part in football matches and other forms of sport,
or to be spectators at such things which were generally organised on
Mondays.49
Piece rates, deep structural changes in the workforce, and the state's increasing
willingness to intervene inall aspectsoftheworkers'Iivesunderwrote thetransformation
of southern Africa's working-class. Mineowners in Southern Rhodesia, for example,
werefascinated withtheprospectofintroducing morefeatures ofscientific management.
Unlike mining capital in South Africa, or farther north in Katanga and Northern
Rhodesia,the mostactivewingof miningcapital in Southern Rhodesia had littleor no
access to thepracticalandengineering experiences of mininginterests in theadvanced
capitalist countries. This probably accounts for their overnightabsorption by foreign
interests after the Second World War.50 However, the southernmost mines had an
unusuallylarge concentration of skilledand semi-skilled African workers-drillmen,
bit sharpeners, hammer"boys," trammers, machinists and the like.By 1930,747of the
1,611 Africanmachinists and drillmen in the industrywereworking on the minesnear
Bulawayo; sowere 1,989of the6,079hammer"boys";4,107of the8,551 trammers and
lashers;and 2,472of 5,773operatives in the mill and reduction plants,»
Accidentrateson the southernmost minesdemonstrated that skilled workers were
greatly affected by the introduction of piece rates. Fatal accidents among skilledand
semi-skilled mineworkersin theBu1awayo andGweloDistricts werefiveand threeand
half timeshigherthanthenationalaverage. Hammer"boys," trammers andlashers, and
drillmensustainedthelargestnumberof fatalaccidents. In 1930,204suchworkers were
killedin industrialaccidentsin Bulawayo andGwelo,while"only" 125diedin thisway
in the other four miningdistrictsof Southern Rhodesia.v Wagesweretieddefinitively
to productivitythroughthepieceratesystem-and in theinstanceof themoreskilledand
experiencedworkers, fatally so.
Workingthe open stopesof gold and base metalmineswasespecially dangerous.
Becauseof the low grade of ore thiskind of workrequireda greateruse of explosives.
When one considers that drillmenand hammer"boys" werepaid on the basis of how
many stopes they blastedopen, and that such constraints tended to undermine safety
precautionsin the mindsof European supervisors, it is notdifficult to see whyAfrican
mineworkers objected to the piece rates.»
By 1934there wasa glut of labor in Rhodesia's mining industry. Wagesfell from
28 shillingsa month in 1930to 20 shillingsa month by 1935.54 Thousands of African
workersfledtheindustryaswagesfell.Goldminingabsorbed thebruntof themanpower
loss.By 1938over7,000workers hadleft thegoldminesof theBulawayo, Salisburyand
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Umtali districts. About half as many had abandoned the coal and base metal mines. By
the middle of the SecondWorldWarmore than a fifth ofthe 1938 complementofAfrican
workers had left the mining industry.55
Production costs continued to rise, however, since employers and the state chose to
buttress their defenses against absconding workers by expanding the ranks of the private
and government constabularies.x Also, the dearth of African labor on white farms
became more acute. The Reform Party government attempted to chum labor out of the
Native Reserves by directly restricting how much maize African peasant farmers could
sell on the market by means of the 1934 Maize Control Act and similar measures. But
the Reform Party did not have much of a political program beyond keeping the more
economically vulnerable strata ofSouthern Rhodesia's white population from slipping
down to the living standards ofmiddling African peasants. Mechanization, the standard
response to labor shortage, was subsequently ruled out, except in the case of the largest
farms, mines and factories.t? On the otherhand, convict labor could not be shifted readily
from farms to mines and back again, particularly since African convicts proved
refractory to all but the most rudimentary unskilled work. Nor were piece rates helpful
inasmuch as imprisonment blunted the likely effect of incentives. Employers, the
mineowners especially, were very much handicapped by more elusive forms of worker
resistance-v'malingering," work-ticket manipulation, and deliberate slowdowns.v
Had it not been for a spurt of American investment after the failure of the Southern
Rhodesian government's direct subsidy plan for the mining industry, this would have
been a very dark period indeed in Southern Rhodesia's business history. The influx of
Americancapitalduring the 19408resuscitated the smallermines. Increased mechanization
followed. Conveyor belts at the face of the smaller mines drastical1y reduced the need
for trammers and hand lashers. Electric rotary drills had an analogous effect on the
numberofjackhammerand drill handlers.w By the end ofthe 1940s Southern Rhodesia's
mining industry came to depend on a core of permanent, relatively skilled African
workers-much like the mining industries of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga after the
big strikes of 1935,1940 and 1941.60 As the number of workers in the industry shrank,
the intensity ofwork increased; wages rose; and until the end of the 1950s, high mortality
and accident rates again became the chief indices of increased output. However, in
contrast to the late 1920s, it was the more unskilled workers-more often than not,
recently come to the mines and refractory to the initiatives of the more experienced
workers-who sustained the largest number of accidents and work-related deaths.si
CONCLUSION
The outbreak of the Second World War forwarded the burgeoning of African
workerconsciousness. This was especially so for mining and heavy industry north of the
Rand, where the growth ofrail facilities governed industry's expansion. Consequently,
the rail industry resorted to padding its workforce with a large number of workers with
little or no experience in order to handle the increased amount of freight carried by the
rail. From the mid-1930s through the 1950s, for example, close to 25 percent of the
African railway workers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland came from
AngolaandMozambique. As a result, African mechanics, handlers, clerks and motormen
13
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were compelled to organize themselves in order to prevent further deterioration of their
wages and working conditions.62
Awed by the thunderous language and politics of the ICU in the late 1920s, but won
over by the more parochial and pragmatic approach of the Bantu Benefit Societies, the
more seasoned African railway workers in the various colonies of southern Africa
epitomized the aspirations of African workers for roughly a decade. As the railway
workers went, so went the rest of the African working-class until the failed 1948 general
strike in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia. The political atmosphere of this period was
palpably more oppressive than that of the late 1920s. The police, particularly the
Criminal Investigations Division (CID) in the British colonies and its functional
equivalentin the Belgian and Portuguese territories,pursued ICU leaders and Watchtower
adepts relentlessly, forcing many of them to seek refuge in rural villages that were
removed from the towns and the rail lines.63 Meanwhile, by means of the Benefit
Societies, African railway workers were beginning to figure importantly in the municipal
compound associations and Native Labor Boards. No doubt their presence on the Labor
Boards helped to constrain the amount of police repression aimed at the lCU.
Yet while the leaders of the railway workers could prevent widespread instances of
police repression, they could not use their position on the labor boards or the township
advisory commissions to champion the cause of the working class as a whole. As railway
workers and other African industrial workers moved toward less politically minded
forms oforganization a deep hiatus was created between the struggles and traditions of
African workers in the 19208 and the developing ones of the more diverse African
workforce of the war period. The African industrial working-class of the 1930s and 40s,
which had been literally remade during the Depression, would have to rediscover the
vocabulary ofclass struggle in the highly charged atmosphere of the Second World War.
One has to pay particular attention to the fate of African peasant farmers, therefore, as
well as that of the industrial workers; for industrialization was a discontinuous process
that formed the obverse side of agrarian transformation. However, this does not mean
that one can gainsay specific political realities of the various countries within southern
Africa over the three generations in question, while concentrating on the fact that
national differences were often the product of transnational developments, and of the
efforts of some of the region's population to escape local constraints.
Throughout southern Africa a burgeoning, and occasionally explosive, urban
population provided the setting in which the industrial working-class could test its
strength. The convergence of the wage question and the prospect of reproducing the
working-class in the urban locations and townships provided the test ofwills with a focal
point. Industrial expansion, coupled with the introduction of piece rates and other
aspects of scientific management, widened the arena of protest. Changes in the process
did in fact foster increased labor militancy. Yet militancy and class consciousness did
not grow spontaneously. The African working-class expressed a more manifold set of
aspirations as the percentage ofAfrican factory operatives and skilled workers grew and
as the political position of the colonial governments weakened during the Second World
War.
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A seriesof changes in the entirebasisof colonialrule, and not simply in the mode
of production,gave Africanworkersthe opportunity to test thedurability of theirlocal
forms of organizationas theychallenged the inequitiesof the workplace and thoseof
society in general.Duringthe DepressionAdventistand millenarian ideologies, which
had originatedamong the peasantry,helped to fashion the new awareness among the
workers.DuringtheSecondWorldWartheworkersforgedpowerful, albeitshort-lived,
visions of distributivejustice by linking this new awareness to a plan of action which
derived from their experiences in southern Africa's mines, factories and towns. The
leadersof theirparochial-and ostensiblyinnocuous-organizations, once forcedonto
the urban terrain, were obliged to act as popular tribunes, even though political
independencewas some distance away. Even the most perceptiveemployer, colonial
administratoror Africanworkercouldnot haveenvisioned sucha rearrangement at the
outset of the Depression. War and economic conjuncture forced everybody's hand,
however,and influencedthe momentum of popular intervention.
Nevertheless, African workers did not make their history in a "just so" fashion.
There were limits to the success of their intervention becauseof underlying economic
constraints and deep seated habits of deference. Moreover, from the middle of the
Depressionto theend of the SecondWorldWar,outputdid increaseand wasof a better
quality in all of southernAfrica's industrialenterprises. Was therea core of contented
Africanworkersuponwhosebackstheburdenof increasedoutputwashoisted? Orwere
the "disciplined" and truculent African worker merely two of several faces of an
expandingand transformedindustrial working-class? Theevidencepointsmoretoward
the latter.
With the onset of the war African industrialworkers were able to draw on a rich
storehouseof informationabout the attitudesof their employersand the colonial state
atdifferentphasesof thebusinesscycle.Thiswasa resultof theirsmalldegreeofsuccess
ingettingwhatandwheretheywantedwithintheworldofthe townsandindustry. Unlike
management's initiatives, those of the African workers-whatever their form-were
geared towardcreating an effectivecounter to sudden shifts in industrial policy. How
Africanworkers in southernAfricamanagedto effect a long-term structural changein
their thought and action as a result of these short-term successes is one of the most
intriguinghistoricalproblemsof themodemera.Strikesandotherworkactionsprovided
them with a means to express theirgrievancesand exercisesome measure of power. In
tum, the prospectof a better life in the towns gave them a much neededballast, and a
means to assess the portents of the future.
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